Ajay Kajla v. Patricia Cleary by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-23-2020 
Ajay Kajla v. Patricia Cleary 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Ajay Kajla v. Patricia Cleary" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 702. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/702 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2020 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











HON. PATRICIA D. BUENO CLEARY, Retired Judge; 
HON. GLENN GRANT, Judge; HON. JOSE L. FUENTES, Judge; 
HON. ELLEN L. KOBLITZ, Judge; HON. DOUGLAS M. FASCIALE, Judge; 
HON. JOHN C. KENNEDY, Judge; HON. SUSAN L. REISNER, Judge; 
HON. KATIE A. GUMMER, Judge; HON. STUART RABNER, Chief Justice; 
OFFICE OF FORECLOSURE, N.J. Superior Court 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-18-cv-15449) 
District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
_____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 January 22, 2020 
 
Before: CHAGARES, RESTREPO and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
 







* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





 Appellant Ajay Kajla, proceeding pro se, appeals from the judgment of the District 
Court dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as well as the 
denial of his request for reconsideration.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we will only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  Kajla defaulted on his home loan in 2007.  The lienholder thereafter 
filed a mortgage foreclosure action in New Jersey state court in December 2007, followed 
by an amended foreclosure complaint in July 2008, and a second amended complaint in 
October 2008.  The Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, granted a final 
judgment of foreclosure in March 2015, after Kajla and his wife failed to appear and 
defaulted the case.  Kajla unsuccessfully filed a motion to vacate the default judgment in 
April 2015.  On September 22, 2016, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate 
Division, affirmed both the second amended final judge of foreclosure and the order 
denying Kajla’s motion to vacate.  See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Kajla, No. A-3875-
14T2, 2016 WL 5210609 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016). 
 In October of 2018, Kajla filed a complaint in the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey against numerous judges of the New Jersey Superior Court, the 
Superior Court – Appellate Division, and the New Jersey Supreme Court who rendered 
various rulings in state court proceedings adjudicating the foreclosure on his house and 
his subsequent eviction, as well as the Office of Foreclosure of the New Jersey Superior 
Court.  Kajla alleged that his home had been foreclosed upon illegally and fraudulently, 
and that his constitutional rights were violated by these actions.  He sought an 
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unspecified amount of monetary damages and the “cessation” of any state court 
proceedings.  See Compl. at ¶ 39. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review of the District Court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  See FOCUS v. Allegheny Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 75 
F.3d 834, 839-40 (3d Cir. 1996).  We review a District Court’s denial of a motion for 
reconsideration for abuse of discretion.  Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, 
Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 The District Court held that consideration of Kajla’s complaint was barred by the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because such appellate jurisdiction rests solely with the United 
States Supreme Court.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to 
review decisions of state courts); Rooker v. Fid. Tr., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); D.C. 
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87 (1983).  The Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine deprives a District Court of jurisdiction to review, directly or indirectly, a state 
court decision.  The Supreme Court has emphasized the narrow scope of the doctrine, 
holding that it is confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”  Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 
 There are four requirements for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply:  “(1) the 
federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries caused by 
[the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit 
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was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state 
judgments.”  Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 
(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284) (alterations in original).  These 
requirements are met here.  Kajla complained he was injured by state court rulings and 
judgments that, inter alia, denied him discovery, were contrary to “their own published 
guidelines and the prevailing [s]tandard,” see Compl. at ¶ 3.1, and permitted the 
fraudulent foreclosure of his home.  Those adjudications predated his federal complaint, 
and were the judgments that Kajla asked the District Court to invalidate.  Thus, to the 
extent the District Court held that Kajla’s request for relief from the foreclosure order 
was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we agree. 
 In his complaint, Kajla also sought unspecified monetary damages from the named 
defendants.  The District Court did not reach this claim, holding instead that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the entire complaint by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  
Nonetheless, it is beyond dispute that “[a] judicial officer in the performance of his duties 
has absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.”  Azubuko v. 
Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006).  Although Kajla asserted that the various judges 
acted “outside their judicial capacities,” he principally complained that the foreclosure 
order was issued erroneously and fraudulently.  Such allegations are insufficient to 
overcome judicial immunity.  See Capogrosso v. Supreme Court of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 
184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding that judicial immunity extends to judicial 
officers, even if their actions were “‘in error, w[ere] done maliciously, or w[ere] in excess 
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of [their] authority,’” unless the judges acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction (quoting 
Azubuko, 443 F.3d at 303)). 
 Furthermore, New Jersey courts, including New Jersey Superior Court’s Office of 
Foreclosure, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.  See, e.g., Haybarger v. 
Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 2008); see also 
Robinson v. N.J. Mercer Cty. Vicinage-Family Div., 514 F. App’x 146, 149 (3d Cir. 
2013) (New Jersey county court was “clearly a part of the State of New Jersey,” so “both 
the court itself and its employees in their official capacities were unconsenting state 
entities entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment”) (citing Chisolm v. 
McManimon, 275 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2001), and Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 
F.3d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
 Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kajla’s motion 
for reconsideration.  The motion was not based on an intervening change in the law, 
newly discovered evidence, or “the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to 
prevent manifest injustice.”  See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 
176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.1 
 
     1 Kajla’s Motion Requesting Justice for Filing Vexatious Letter/Document is 
denied.  There is nothing to suggest that the letter referenced in appellant’s motion was 
filed by its author for any improper purpose as opposed to simply having been filed on 
the dockets of two related appeals.  Additionally, we note that the letter has long since 
been removed from the electronic docket in this appeal. 
